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INTRODUCTION

William E. Gladstone was the rising star of the Liberal Party
between 1859 and 1874.

His domestic and foreign policy played a

role in the two most important developments of this period in British
History:

the surge of liberalism and the loss of British influence

in European affairs.

Because he was the leading British statesman

of the period, Gladstone's statesmanship is widely blamed by
contemporaries and historians for Britain's decline in European
affairs at the time of otto von Bismarck's ascendancy.

This study

seeks to answer the question of whether Gladstone's statesmanship is
to blame for Great Britain's dramatic slip in European influence.
The prevailing view is that Gladstone's statesmanship in
this period failed to contend with the shrewd Realpolitik of
Bismarck.

As a result, critics of Gladstone contend, Britain fell

from the leading role to secondary status in European diplomatic
circles in less than ten years.

Historians like Paul Kennedy and

Raymond sontag condemn Gladstone's statesmanship, while others,
such as Paul Knaplund and H.C.G. Matthew, applaud Gladstone's
pursuit of morality in his policy, but see his statesmanship as
second-rate.

Similarly, contemporaries like Bismarck and Napoleon

III had little respect for Gladstone's diplomacy.

While each of

these interpretations raises valid points, none takes into account
the crucial interplay of foreign and domestic events that limited
the options available for British diplomacy to respond to the
challenges of a new Bismarckian order in Europe.
This study considers the tumultous political environment
1

facing Gladstone both at home and abroad as an accelerator of
British isolation from European affairs.

The interpretation that

follows demonstrates the critical interplay between internal and
external affairs by targetting two factors that hamstrung Gladstone's
statesmanship between 1859 and 1874.

First, Gladstone inherited

a bankrupt and impotent foreign policy from Lord Palmerston's last
five years at the helm.

By 1864, the new Bismarckian order had been

established and British isolation had been ensured.

Secondly, the

rise of liberalism in Britain preoccupied Gladstone's policy
throughout the period, with most of his time and energy spent
uniting the Liberal Party with his legislative agenda.

Indeed,

the constraints on her policy were so great that it would not be
an overstatement to say that Britain would have found herself just
as isolated by 1874 even if Bismarck and Gladstone had exchanged
positions and Britain found herself under the guiding hands of the
Iron Chancellor.

The rise of liberalism in Britain and the limited

options of British diplomacy painted Gladstone's statesmanship into
a corner.
In what follows, the constraints on British policy that led
to Britain's retreat into diplomatic isolation will be discussed
so that Gladstone's statesmanship can be evaluated.

In this pursuit,

The Gladstone Diaries, edited in this period by H.C.G. Matthew,
several articles written by Gladstone, and Hansard's Parliamentary
Debates, were invaluable tools for understanding the motivations,
inner thoughts, and preoccupations of the leader of the Liberal Party.
These primary sources allowed a glimpse at Gladstone's sophisticated
measuring of the national pulse on domestic and external issues,
2

which enabled him to adjust his policy to political exigencies for
the benefit of the Liberal Party and his country.

Gladstone's

tailoring of his policy to the prevailing winds of his nation is a
useful index of the rise of liberalism in Britain in this period.
Because the unity of the British Liberal Party is central to
understanding the presence of internal and external constraints
on Gladstone's statesmanship, two approaches to the rise of
liberalism were used in this study.

First, Gladstone's legislative

agenda and ideology will be analyzed to demonstrate the degree of
interplay between events in foreign and domestic policy.

The

impact of such events as the Italian Question, the American civil
War, the Reform Bill of 1867, and the Irish legislation on Gladstone's
political outlook and the state of the liberal coalition will be
measured by considering the opinions of contemporaries and historians,
and election and by-election data.
Secondly, the three distinct stages of development for
Gladstone and the Liberal Party are reflected by the division of
this study into three phases.

Phase I, 1859 to 1865, represents

Gladstone's apprenticeship as a statesman, as Gladstone tackled the
challenges of pluralism and unified the Liberal Party through his
financial policy, while British diplomacy was made impotent by the
presence of the new Bismarckian order in Europe after the SchleswigHolstein Crisis in 1864.

In Phase II, 1865 to 1868, Gladstone

emerged as the leading British statesman and the leader of the
Liberal Party through his Reform Bill victory in 1867.
1869 to 1874, was the test of Gladstonian Liberalism.
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Phase III,
As Prime

Minister, Gladstone's legislative agenda led to the fall of his
first Ministry, while his foreign policy was successful despite
the limited options available to British diplomacy.

It will be

shown that, by 1874, despite Gladstone's effective leadership, the
domestic challenges of the rise of liberalism and the development
of the Bismarckian order in Europe combined to leave Britain
diplomatically isolated.
The legacy of Gladstone's statesmanship between 1859 and
1874 has been misunderstood by most observers.

Faced with

unprecedented challenges from all sides and at each turn,
Gladstone fostered the acceptance of the liberal state in
Britain and lost little ground in the European political arena.
In so doing, Gladstone cleared the obstacles posed by the complex
interaction of domestic and foreign challenges and left his mark
on British History by obtaining a leading role for morality and
justice in British politics.

4

PHASE I:

1859 to 1865

The British Liberal Party in Phase I of this study was under
the guidance of Lord Palmerston and Lord Russell, but its rise was
due primarily to the financial wizardry of Gladstone as Chancellor
of the Exchequer.

Events at home and abroad combined to leave

Britain diplomatically isolated by Palmerston's death in 1865.

A

Britain with more diplomatic options and unchallenged by the rise
of pluralism might have posed a worthy opponent to otto von Bismarck
in European politics, but, with a fragmented majority party and
isolated by the new Bismarckian order, her statesmen lacked the
maneuverability to reverse her decline in Europe.
In Phase I, Gladstone's second term as Chancellor of the
Exchequer, he rose to national prominence and served his apprenticeship
as a statesman.

In this period, he was preoccupied by financial

questions and domestic events and rarely strayed from the positions
taken by Palmerston and Russell on foreign affairs.

His interventions

were on disagreements of degree rather than of substance.

still

maturing as a statesman, he gained public acclaim for his considerable
talents in finance.

His successes in the financial realm unified

the Liberal Party as a leading radical, Richard Cobden, notes:
"I consider that you alone have kept the party together so long
by your great budgets. 1I1

Gladstone's skills in finance assured

his acceptance into the party leadership.
Gladstone's was an eclectic political philosophy, with a
pragmatic instinct for the "ripeness" of an issue or policy in
harmony with his distinct ethical code of public service.
5

His

approach refused to compromise his high principles in the political
arena.

Gladstone's energy as a public servant was unbounded and

study of his diaries attests to his ascetic pursuit of the national
interest and his uncanny sense of political timing.

His evolution

from Tory "Boy Wonder" to progressive national leader reflects his
sensitivity to the prevailing mood of his country.2

In Phase I,

Gladstone poured his personal and political resources into solving
the complex financial problems of the day so that he could unify
the Liberal Party.
While there was certainly no love lost between Palmerston
and Gladstone over the course of policy, both were capable of
setting aside their mutual disaffection and tolerating the other
in their professional interaction. 3

Each respected the

political skills, will, and intellect of the other and their
differences lay not over objectives of policy, but over principles.
Palmerston was concerned only with maintaining and increasing
British influence in Europe and his Ministry's influence at home.
The pagan "enfant terrible" could neither adapt himself, nor explain
himself, to the pious chancellor. 4

Their antagonism was most

divisive over the the defense estimates.

While Palmers ton sought

huge increases in British fortifications to counter the French
buildup across the Channel, Gladstone sought to limit defense
spending.

Gladstone's skills in finance, and the widespread

popularity such ability entailed, bridged the gulf between their
diverging ideologies.

The battles between British statesmen in Phase I stemmed from
6

conflicting approaches to foreign policy.

The foreign policies of

Lord Russell, Lord Palmerston and Gladstone reflect the ideology
and respective constituencies of each within the Liberal Party.

As

Foreign Secretary, Russell voiced his diplomatic principles: 5
.... the Powers of Europe, if they wish to maintain that
peace, must respect each other's rights, must respect
each other's limits, and, above all, restore and not
disturb that commercial confidence which is the result
of peace, which tends to peace, and which ultimately
forms the happiness of nations.
Russell's foreign policy was that of a mainstream whig, prudently
seeking to assert British influence while avoiding risky ventures. 6
To Palmerston, maximizing British interests was the sole
guideline of foreign policy.

with a role in British diplomacy

since 1829, his policies had propelled Britain to a leading role
in Europe.

During the Italian Question in 1860, Palmerston expressed

his foreign policy doctrine: 7
England is one of the greatest powers of the world ...
and her right to have and express opinions on
matters ... bearing on her interests is unquestionable;
and she is equally entitled to give upon such matters
any advice which she might think useful, or to suggest
any arrangements which she may deem conducive to the
general good.
His bluffs and bullying brought the ire of many in his Cabinet,
the Court, and within parliament, but Palmerston had asserted
British influence whenever possible, regardless of the risks
involved.
Gladstone took a more internationalist stance and held up his
policy to a moral litmus test.

Indeed, one can trace the origins

of the League of Nations in Paul Knaplund's interpretation of the
Gladstone Doctrine of foreign policy:8
7

He advocated applying the principles of the Sermon on
the Mount in dealing with foreign nations -- law,
justice, and the equal rights of all nations should
prevail and be recognized; British statesmen should
strive to promote peace, should further the cause of
nationality and political liberty, should seek to
maintain the concert of Europe; they must avoid landgrabbing and beware of the delusion that peace is
promoted by large armaments.
The concept of morality in foreign relations fits into Gladstone's
ideology.

Despite his insulation from the Foreign Office, Gladstone

reserved the right to comment on moral questions in European affairs.
During Phase I he voiced his views on the Italian Question, the Papal
States, the American Civil War, the Cobden Treaty, and the treatment
of Denmark in the Schleswig-Holstein Affair.
Domestically, the British Liberal Party in 1859 was incohesive.
Nominally, it included a part of every class of British society
under the patronage of Palmerston, Russell, and Gladstone.

In real

terms, the party had yet to evolve from a mere parliamentary entity
to

a national

party.

It remained a precarious coalition of whigs,

liberal businessmen, and radical nonconformists.

Five factors

stemming from the party's fragmented nature accelerated its rise
to national prominence

These factors include the loose leadership

of the official party, the growth of the provincial press, the
agitation of the working class and nonconformists, and the loyalty
of the whigs to the Liberal Party even after the death of Lord
Palmerston.

Because of these factors, the party was well poised for

battle with the Tories by 1865.

First, the loose leadership of the party allowed Gladstone
the flexibility in his financial policy to gain untapped power
8

brokers.

His budgets were as calculating politically as they were

brilliant fiscally and they helped to unify the Liberal Party.
Through targetted concessions in the budget, including tax breaks
and the removal of tariffs, Gladstone improved the livelihoods of
groups he coveted.

Each segment of the budget could be acclaimed

by a class of British society and Gladstone and the Liberal Party,
in turn, gained their allegiance.
Secondly, Gladstone founded the penny press by repealing the
Paper Duties in 1861.

The new penny press diffused ideas and

propaganda to the poorer classes and across the countryside through
a growing network of provincial newspapers.

The press adopted the

responsibility of enlightening, civilizing, and morally transforming
the world;9 and great orators, like Gladstone and John Bright,
gained national followings.

As a result, Gladstone became identified

with the novelty of this new movement and reaped the benefits of
strong relationships with many influential members of the press,
including Thornton Leigh Hunt of the Daily Telegraph. 10
Through his use of press releases, leaks to the press, and by
publishing his speeches, Gladstone established the Liberal Party
as a national entity.
Thirdly, he turned to the growing working class movement.
The working classes provided a national base of support and a preexisting network of union organization in many industries.

Gladstone

had no reverence for working class society, but was pleased to
make the Liberal Party the only option for its electors, thereby
undergirding his national support.
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By repealing the Paper Duties

and removing tariffs on such working class food staples as beer,
tea, coffee, and sugar in his budgets, Gladstone captured the
working class for his party.

But, he was hardly ecstatic about

including the working class in his coalition:

"God knows I have

not courted them, I hope I do not rely on them." 11
Fourthly, Gladstone gained the support of nonconformists within
the Commons and in British boroughs.

These men were committed to

Gladstone's agenda of social welfare and could command tremendous
resources because of their abundance of time, energy, popular
connections and money.

They pursued a better society with the same

motivation that brought them their fortunes and political influence.
To gain their support, Gladstone turned to his 1860 Budget by
granting tax exemptions for life-insurance policies and deferred
annuities.

Thus, he could shield the non-landed from the burden

of an increase in income tax while at the same time stimulating
the economy_
Finally, Gladstone's concessions to the landed whigs ensured
the emergence of the Liberal Party.

The whigs were a conservative

force within the liberal coalition and sought to maintain their
privileged social and economic position.

His refusal to attach

himself too closely to the radicals in his policy initiatives by
ste~ring

clear of reform, abolition of the Church Rates, and

financial attacks on the whig lifestyle assured their support.
Also, his piecemeal liberalism was attractive to the whigs because
of their disrespect for Disraeli and their identification with
Palmerston and Russell.
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Gladstone's tailoring of financial policy to the unlikely
coalition of whigs, liberals, radicals, nonconformists, and the
working class in Phase I made him the leader of the Liberal Party.
His financial policy combined his ethical code of politics, including
free trade, social welfare and retrenchment, with a pragmatic
adjustment to a changing British political landscape.

Meanwhile,

the challenges to British foreign policy in these years also
contributed to the growth of pluralism in British politics.

Both

the Italian Question and the American Civil War turned into domestic
issues that strengthened the liberal coalition.
Three new developments imposed constraints on British foreign
policy.

First, the rise of newspapers such as the Times, the

Daily Telegraph, the Bee Hive, and the provincial press
meant that statesmen had to devote more time and energy to relations
with the press.

Secondly, Queen Victoria's demands for an increased

role in foreign affairs, especially after the death of Prince Albert
in 1861, slowed the response of British diplomacy.

Finally, special

interests used the press and the absence of party stability as an
opportunity to assert their role in foreign policy.

For example,

unions and business groups were active on the American Civil War,
while radical and agriculture lobbies were active on the Cobden
Treaty.
Gladstone stepped into the foreign policy arena when questions
of morality arose.

His interventions took the form of public speeches,

articles, and Cabinet memoranda.

The infrequency of his comments

on foreign policy is due to his preoccupation with the time-consuming

11

duties of his office.

But, his sense of national interest would

not allow him silence during these years of decreasing British
influence.

Each crisis in international affairs in Phase I

influenced Britain both domestically and in her position among the
other powers of Europe.

The impact of each event on the unity of

the Liberal Party, the new Bismarckian order, fundamental British
interests, and Gladstone's ideology will be discussed.

Because

they had the greatest impact domestically in Britain, the Italian
Question and the American civil War will be considered first.
The Italian Question erupted in early 1858 and remained a
leading issue in European affairs for the next three years.

Cavour's

brilliant manipulation of Napoleon III's territorial aspirations
combined with the failure of Austrian and Russian diplomacy to
allow Italian unification in 1861.

Italian statesmen understood

that Italy could be unified only by exploiting the differences
between the Great powers.12

Cavour embarked on his path with

the benefit of Napoleon's sponsorship, assured by the Franco-Sardinian
Treaty of January 2, 1859, Austrian isolation, assured by the FrancoRussian Treaty of March 3, 1859, and Britain's tacit compliance.
His diplomatic skill transformed a war that lacked justification on
any basis of international law into one that has been unanimously
approved by posterity.13
In Britain, Cavour's Italy was applauded for confronting
the decaying forces of reaction and conservatism in Austria.

The

cause of Italian unification became a rallying point for the
blossoming liberal coalition.
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The consensus in Britain was for

neutrality with an assurance that Napoleon would make no "territorial
demands and Austria would lose little of its influence in Europe,
especially in the Near East.

Britain's support for the Sardinian

cause made Palmers ton assert that Austria could appeal to the
judgement but not the sympathies of Europe. 14

Academics who

embraced Italian nationalism and praised Cavour as a prudent liberal
formed an unlikely coalition with the working class over the Italian
Question because of shared enthusiasm for Italian liberalism and
shared enmity for Austrian conservatism. 15

Identification with

the Italian movement transcended parochial class distinctions,
allowing radicals and whigs alike to support Cavour and his attractive
nationalism.
The unification of Italy was the first hint of a new Bismarckian
European order that would overthrow the system established at Vienna
in 1815.

Three factors brought on the upheaval.

First, the Italian

uprising upset the balance of power in Europe by diminishing Austrian
influence.

The Franco-Russian Entente and Bismarck's competition

within Germany combined to destroy Austrian hopes for a Holy Alliance
and left Austria diplomatically isolated during the critical battles
of the days ahead.

Secondly, French adventurism increased British

distrust of Napoleon.

The British viewed him as expansionist and

saw no reason to bridge the gap between their policies which would
hamper the future responses of both to the challenges of the new
Bismarckian order.

Finally, the Czar had asserted his unwillingness

to playa role in western Europe.

He would only pledge his assistance

to Napoleon in return for the promise of future gains in the Near
East.
13

At the outset of the Italian conflict, Gladstone was preoccupied
with domestic problems and seemed indifferent.

In his diary he shows

his removal from the question:

May God direct it." l6

"War is begun.

But, he soon stated his views on the conflict in an article in the
Quarterly Review and in a memorandum on the Papal states.

Both

show exceptionally well-informed opinions on a foreign policy question
for a Chancellor of the Exchequer.
In the article, Gladstone spells out his argument for Britain
to tread lightly in Italy.
the French and Austrians.

First, he condemns the policies of both
He attacked the Austrian treatment of the

Italians, and he saw the infamous Buol Dispatch of February 25, 1859,
to illustrate that, "a blind Conservatism may come to be the most
dangerous Radicalism, and that the closets and cabinets of despotic
sovereigns are too often the main factories of Revolution. 1117
He saw Austrian policy necessitating that, "in no other way than by
the sword shall any Italian be free." 18

His respect for

international law and morality in foreign policy made him appeal to
the Austrians to rule within the limits of legal rights.

But,

Gladstone could use nothing more than words, for he maintained that
an Austrian military presence was vital to the European balance of
power.

Gladstone was fearful of the territorial designs of Napoleon,

but understood his position:

"she is strong enough to paralyse that

commanding union of force and authority, by which alone, placed on
the side of right, the Italian question can be peacefully adjusted.,,19
Gladstone's policy was for support of Cavour through neutrality.
Gladstone was hopeful for Sardinian liberalism.
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He praised

Italian unification from within and applauded Cavour for planting
a tree of liberty that had been watered neither by blood nor tears.
His view was similar to that of Palmerston and Russell, but it was
within his own moral framework.

He held that the British role in

the conflict should be to urge the principles of reason and justice
while standing clear of selfish interest. 20

So long as the

conflict destroyed little of Austria's power in the Near East and
did not spur the adventurism of Napoleon, Gladstone supported the
Italian cause.
Gladstone then discussed the Papal states.

With a mixture of

sympathy for the national self-determination of the Papal subjects
and long-standing anti-Papism, he condemned the Papacy as the worst
and most ridiculous of European governments.

He maintained that

the only remedy for the existing evils was the permanent separation
of the temporal from the spiritual power.
and anarchy

The stagnation, imbecility,

of Papal rule confronted Gladstone's notion of religious

self-determination, which held that the state should be detached from
the church. 21

His attack on the temporal power of the Papacy

appealed to the progressive sector of the Liberal party.22
Just as in the Italian Question, the American civil War
penetrated British politics at many levels and posed a challenge to
British statesmen.

While the early days of the civil War sharpened

existing divisions in British society, the Emancipation Proclamation
of September, 1862, strengthened the liberal coalition.

The

identification of the sectors of the British polity with the Union
and the Confederacy respectively was a veil for the social and

15

political antagonisms prevailing in Britain and taught Gladstone
valuable lessons about the interplay of domestic and foreign policy
in British politics. 23

The Union's victory accelerated the growth

of liberalism in Britain and challenged the privileges of the landed
classes.
The pro-Confederacy sentiment in Britain was a combination
of businessmen, workers hurt by the Northern blockade and classconscious aristocracy.

It was a sector concerned primarily with

social and economic factors.

The disaffected workers hit hardest

by the blockade were spurred by the powerful Bee Hive, while
the landed feared that a victory by the industrialized North would
set a dangerous precedent for their lifestyles and businessmen
feared the costs to British commerce.

Additionally, moderates in

the Liberal Party were uneasy about Lincoln's friendship with British
Radicals and with John Bright, whose ideals, friends, and works
were anathema to them. 24

Palmerston, Russell, and Gladstone

were all card-carrying supporters of the confederacy.25
On the other hand, Unionist sentiment in Britain mirrored the
liberal coalition itself, lacking only the support of its leading
statesmen and the whigs.

It included the working class, radicals

and academics, who unlike the pro-Confederacy coalition, did not
have their livelihoods at stake in the American conflict.

They

were therefore willing to overlook economic considerations for the
cause of the Union's liberalism.

Radicals were strongly pro-Union

and Bright himself respected the opportunities offered by the North's
tenet that "every man may hope and does hope to rise to wealth. ,,26

16

Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation was a turning point for
the Liberal Party by delivering the bulk of the working class to
the Unionist position. 27

Gladstone followed Lincoln's message

with his own powerful speech at Newcastle on October 8, 1862.

His

oversight of British finance would not allow him to overlook the
economic costs of the Northern blockade.

First, he appealed to

pocketbooks by outlining the decline of the British economy as a
result of the Northern blockade.

He speculated that the value of

British trade with the united states had diminished by as much as
nine and a half million pounds, and the quadrupled price of cotton
meant that only

"one-half of the owners of mills and factories are

keeping open their works. 1128
Finally, he expressed his contempt for the Northern government,
which he felt was growing too fast and had too often threatened
Canada. 29

On the other hand, Gladstone had nothing but respect

for the Confederate leaders, perhaps seeing a reflection of the
British model in their institutions:

"There is no doubt that

Jefferson Davis and other leaders of the South have made an army;
they are making a navy; and they have made what is more than either
-- they have made a nation.,,30

A large segment of the whigs

shared this view and Gladstone could overlook none of the economic
hardships caused by the Northern blockade, nor could he afford to
compromise whig opinion.
Gladstone's brilliance as Chancellor of the Exchequer in
Phase I responded to the rise of pluralism and united the liberal
coalition.

But, on the issue of parliamentary reform, he was more

17

a man of his time.

The editor of his diaries, H.C.G. Matthew,

observes that the curious dislocation of early victorian politics
meant that "fiscal liberalism had been achieved while political
liberalism had barely begun. 11 3 1

It was no accident that

Gladstone's liberalism failed to spillover into the reform question,
for he believed that support for reform might be enough to push the
whigs into the waiting arms of the Tories. 32

Also, his keen

sense of timing and feel for the "ripeness" of issues, his personal
reservations about the reform issue, and the opposition of Palmerston,
the Court, and the Cabinet to reform initiatives made him rely on
financial questions to popularize his party.33

Thus, he took

the safest course to form a consensus for his party while keeping
whig support intact.
In Gladstone's pursuit of a greater Britain, he combined a
Burkean, incremental course that would avoid great upheavals in
policy with a Peelite concern for government thrift. 34

He

waited for the prevailing temper of the nation to demand change
and planned his course accordingly.

with long range political

objectives in mind, he would allow economic progress to silence
cries for parliamentary reform until action was made necessary.
Indeed, his increase of the income tax in the 1860 Budget was
particularly sensitive to the social repercussions of the tax.
Moreover, his bitter clashes with Somerset at the Admiralty and his
long-time friend Herbert at the War Office show his deep concerns
about the implications of government spending priorities.
Gladstone's concept of morality in the practice of politics

18

was the backbone of his ideology and the chief motivator of his
policy.

Even up to 1865 he saw little prospect of peaceful,

major change in Britain, so he zealously pursued smaller alterations
like reducing waste and spending.

He stated that, "Religion and

Christian virtue, like the faculty of taste and perception of
beauty, have their place, ay and that the first place", in the
conduct of politics. 35

He applied his distinct ethical code to

his political life like no other British statesman before or since.
The Cobden Treaty of 1861 was perhaps Gladstone's most active
involvement in the realm of foreign affairs as Chancellor of the
Exchequer.

Apart from the leading role free trade played in his

ideology, he saw economic and diplomatic benefits in the Cobden
Treaty.

After concluding the treaty, he outlined his achievement:

"Whatever may have been our most sanguine expectations as to the
operation of that treaty, whether in a social or commercial sense,
up to this moment, they have been more than fulfilled.,,36

The

significance of the treaty lies in its impact domestically.

It

allowed the Liberal Party to corner the popular issue of free trade.
But the treaty failed to defuse growing tensions on both sides
of the Channel sparked by the French annexation of Nice and Savoy
in 1860 and the race in armaments.

The Anglo-French antagonism

would plague the conduct of British foreign and domestic policy
throughout this period.

When Napoleon expressed his intention to

reassert French influence in world affairs, even at the cost of
friendly relations with the British Government, by augmenting
French sea power, he touched on raw British nerves. 37
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British

statesmen disagreed about the readiness of the nation's defenses in
the face of the French threat and a controversy soon developed with
Palmerston and the Court taking up the cause of fortification.
Gladstone, true to his minimalist view of finance, sought to constrain
defense spending and the Cobden Treaty could alleviate much of
the Treasury's burden while fitting easily into his objective of
creating a model of international free trade. 38
Gladstone hoped to construct a bridge of friendship, supported
by pillars of economic interdependence between the two nations. 39
In so doing, he ran into the opposition of Palmerston, who saw
the treaty as creating a greater need for fortification. 40

The

latter had the support of both the Cabinet and the Court, while
Gladstone depended on an alliance of Cobdenite radicals, free trade
whigs, business interests, and liberal intellectuals.

Gladstone

joined Cobden in negotiations with the French and reached an
agreement without consulting either Palmerston or the Foreign
Office.

The treaty itself was narrow in its economic scope, but

rich in its symbolic benefits domestically for the Liberal Party.
The Italian Question, the American civil War, and the Cobden
Treaty constituted Gladstone's active participation in foreign
affairs during Phase I of this study.

In each question, domestic

considerations and Gladstone's personal ideology were the chief
motivations behind his policy.

Although his diaries show some

additional interest in the course of continental events, he was
too immersed in domestic affairs to contend with challenges on the
continent that had little impact on the unity of the Liberal Party.

20

Events had hemmed Britain into a predictable course in its
foreign policy and Bismarck took full advantage of her inflexibility
in the Polish Question and the Schleswig-Holstein Crisis.

Palmerston's

diplomatic glory was behind him and his aggressiveness and adventuring
spirit were gradually deserting him.41

Facing the new and unique

challenges of the rise of pluralism and with few diplomatic options,
Britain fell prey to the new Bismarckian order in Europe.

Thus, by

Palmerston's death in October of 1865 Britain stood isolated and
with a greatly diminished role in Europe.
The insurrection in Poland on January 24, 1863, further shook
the European order.

A new instability developed in European diplomacy

which would allow the Iron Chancellor to gain for Prussia the leading
role in the German Confederation and in European affairs.

Bismarck's

success was due to British diplomatic impotency, the gulf between
British and French diplomacy, the isolation of Austria, and the Iron
Chancellor's manipulation of the Czar.

After the Polish Question,

Bismarck's control of European diplomacy was firmly established.
Popular sentiment in Britain was supportive of the Polish rebels,
but Palmerston and Russell had no diplomatic options.

First, Queen

Victoria's Prussophile leanings made her veto both unilateral and
joint intervention in the crisis.

In hindsight, the handicaps under

which the Foreign Office worked makes her view seem reasonable. 42
Secondly, growing British distrust of Napoleon ruled out cooperation
at a time when England, coming to grips with Bismarck, needed French
support as never before. 43

Napoleon risked the Franco-Russian

Entente by bowing to French public opinion and expressing his support
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for the insurrection.

Finally, Austria, hardly a friend to Britain

against her brother emperors, could do nothing but follow the Prussian
lead in Poland because of her precariousness in the German Confederation
Although there was little chance of a renewal of the Holy Alliance,
due to competition between Austria and Prussia in Germany and Austria
and Russia in the Near East, Britain could turn to none of the three
eastern powers.

In European diplomacy, Britain's hands were tied.

Limited to rhetoric, Palmerston thus turned to sharp and
persistent protests to st. petersburg. 44

The absence of the

Chancellor of the Exchequer's opinions on the question is perhaps an
indication of its limited impact on domestic affairs.

There is no

more than casual mention of the affair in his diaries and there is
little indication that he would have taken a separate course from
that of Palmerston.

Moreover, Gladstone defended the Government's

policy in the Commons, arguing that Britain should not lose its
bargaining position on behalf of the Polish people at st. petersburg. 45
The Schleswig-Holstein Crisis of 1864 confirmed Bismarck's
diplomatic mastery of Europe and culminated in Britain and Palmerston
"drinking a cup of humiliation more bitter" than any before. 46
The Danish defeat on July 20, 1864, left Britain an isolated and
weary nation.

In Schleswig-Holstein, as in the Polish Question,

events beyond the control of British statesmen limited their possible
responses to the aggression of Prussia and Austria against Denmark.
European diplomacy had taken an uncertain turn and the checks on
aggressive policy were removed:

the eastern powers could no longer

restrain France, France could no longer restrain Russia, and France
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and Russia could no longer restrain Austria and Prussia. 47

The

growing British contempt for the fickleness of Napoleon, the
Francophobe outlook of the Queen, and Austria and Russia's position
in the Prussian orbit combined to rule out joint action on Denmark's
behalf.
With an absence of a domestic consensus and a new European order,
Britain had no options.

Palmerston sought to guarantee Copenhagen,

but his inability to bring the Cabinet to his view made him balk at
the guarantee.

Because of British inaction, the Danes overestimated

their support from Britain, and ended any chance of their adopting
a conciliatory attitude towards the Germans. 48

Queen victoria

and the Cabinet responded by ruling out British military intervention,
which not only allowed the annexation of the duchies by the German
powers, but was also the final demonstration of British isolation
from the events of the continent.
Again, the Chancellor of the Exchequer did not provide an
alternative to Palmerston's policy.

He outlines his mainstream

position against British intervention in the crisis in his diary:49
We don't meddle with the war but think independence of
D(enmark) a matter of importance to us & all, so we say
thus far no further -- we will not see Denmark utterly
crushed. Get engagement from Aust. & Pruss. that wd.
confine their operations to the continent & adjacent
islands & not attack Copenhagen.
Gladstone also adopted a

non-interventionist stance in the

Cabinet on June 25, 1864, by voting against Palmerston and
Russell on technical language that would ensure the protection of
Copenhagen. 50

Gladstone showed no overriding concern with the

Danish Question, merely making a plea against British overcommitment.
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In his preparation for a leading role in British politics in
Phase I, Gladstone adjusted his policy to a changing Britain.

His

financial policy assured him a larger role in the cabinet and British
politics and increased the strength of the Liberal Party.

Gladstone's

rise to influence through his financial policy mirrored the rise of
the Liberal Party to the forefront of British politics. 51 While
the Liberal Party was by no means dominant by 1865, it had emerged
as a national force in British politics.
Gladstone's interest in foreign policy in Phase I of this
study was dominated by his political morality and the value of issues
to the unity of the Liberal Party.

His comments and actions on the

Italian Question, the American Civil War, and the Cobden Treaty
demonstrated his position as the leading moral conscience in British
politics.

Nonetheless, the lack of British diplomatic options doomed

the efforts of British statesmen to reverse the loss of Britain's
influence in the new Bismarckian order.

The outcome of Phase I of

this study reveals a Britain occupying a severely diminished role in
Europe and Gladstone as the rising star of British politics.
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PHASE II:

1865 to 1868

In Phase II of this study, British statesmen faced domestic
turmoil in the form of party strife and the development of such
controversial issues as parliamentary reform and Irish Church
disestablishment.

These issues combined with new diplomatic

challenges to continue the retreat of British foreign policy into
isolation from continental affairs.

It will be argued below that

Gladstone and other British leaders in this period faced domestic
upheaval and had few diplomatic options in responding to events on
the continent.

With Britain in isolation an obstacle was removed

for otto von Bismarck to consolidate his hold on Europe.
This political turmoil provided Gladstone with perhaps his
greatest tests as a statesman.

He used his parliamentary skill,

moral integrity and political resiliency to adjust to a volatile
electorate and an increasingly unpredictable House of Commons.
In Phase II he emerged as the leader of the Liberal Party by
withstanding a major embarrassment in the Reform Bill debacle of
1866, and uniting his party by reshaping the 1867 Reform Bill; by
introducing legislation to disestablish the Irish Church in 1868;
and by gaining a commanding majority in the 1868 elections.
Although few statesmen have dealt more successfully with subjects
of such difficulty, Gladstone maintained his principles and made
the transition from efficient administrator to national political
leader. 1
Domestically, Gladstone's ethical code provided him a
framework for adjusting his ideology to the challenges of pluralism.
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His ideology combined a sophisticated measure of public opinion
with his high principles and religious fervor.

To Gladstone, Britain

was a moral society distinct from religion, but destined to combine
and coalesce with it, so that she could become the liberal example
for the world. 2
By 1865 the Bismarckian order had been firmly established in
Europe.

European affairs became a more complex game of diplomacy

where national interest alone was paramount. 3

This new order

dealt Britain a hand that greatly increased her diplomatic isolation.
The uncertainty in the European political arena limited Britain's
options so that she could regain little of her previous influence
in European affairs.
Any study of the Liberal Party in this period should consider
the question of Gladstone's opportunism.

His political skills and

instinct for the "ripeness" of issues led many observers to contend
that his approach to politics smelled of opportunism.

Some argue

that Gladstone's religious convictions were merely a cover for his
political ambition, and that his moral righteousness blinded him to
the fact that his original motivation was usually political. 4
Others doubt that Gladstone's political career had been sustained
by anything more than personal ambition. 5

Additionally, one

could argue that Gladstone played a leading role in "ripening"
issues like parliamentary reform and the Irish Question merely for
his own and his party's political benefit.
Gladstone's principles and objectives and the political
environment in Britain in this period reveal two flaws in the theory.
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First, Gladstone's diaries show the painstaking decision-making
process he underwent to arrive at his positions on issues like
Ireland and parliamentary reform.

For example, Gladstone saw his

early support for disestablishment of the Irish Church as an
"embryo opinion in my mind as there was no cause to precipitate it
into life, and (I) waited to fortify or alter or invalidate it by
the teachings of experience. 1I6

He went to similar lengths to

adopt a position of support for parliamentary reform, condemning
those who thought that it was a "subject to be played with or traded
on.,,7

In both instances, Gladstone had taken years to develop

his positions.

Secondly, the political climate in Victorian Britain

was far too complex for a statesman of even Gladstone's stature to
steer events to his own political end.

Such an interpretation places

too great an emphasis on the role of the individual in modern society.
Gladstone's skill in adjusting his outlook to political
exigencies cannot alone mark him an opportunist.

His biographer,

John Morley, disagrees with attempts to label Gladstone as such,
adding that, "if an opportunist be defined as a statesman who
declines to attempt to do a thing until he believes that it can
really be done, what is this but to call him a man of common
sense?"S

Gladstone never compromised his principles, he merely

made adjustments in the timing, accent, and method of achieving
his political objectives.

It was Disraeli, his opponent on the

Conservative front bench, who is more deserving of the opportunist
label.
The death of Lord Palmers ton left the Liberal Party a precarious
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coalition of liberals, radicals, whigs and nonconformists both within
and outside the House of Commons.

By 1868, Gladstone had used two

issues -- restructuring the 1866 Reform Bill and initiating Irish
Church disestablishment

to unify the coalition.

He created the

whig-working class entente to act as a double weapon for the Liberal
Party on the reform question.

On one hand, addressing the reform

question would yield the balance of the British working class and
radicals for the Liberal Party, while, on the other, the whig sector
would guard against frivolous legislation that might lead to domestic
upheaval.
By maintaining his link to Palmerston and Russell's moderate
and non-revolutionary liberalism, Gladstone enjoyed the support of
the whigs.

Although his vague agenda made a certain degree of

disunity unavoidable, it also enabled the party to include a variety
of opinions which acted at the same time as a powerful influence
against disintegration. 9

Indeed, the absence of party dogma

and the lack of a clearcut leadership hierarchy, as under Lord
Palmerston, combined with continued widespread dislike of Disraeli
to provide Gladstone with a strong majority in the Commons.

Gladstone

further improved his popularity by extra-parliamentary addresses and
by maintaining a strong relationship with the press.
Gladstone's whig-working class entente shows his sophisticated
tailoring of the Liberal Party's message.

He could embody the whig

social ideal by keeping radical pressures and extra-parliamentary
agitation in check and guiding those energies into constructive,
but safe channels,10 while attending to working class hopes
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of social mobility.

Gladstone's remarks on May 11, 1864, often

referred to as his "Pale of the Constitution" Speech, show his
willingness to make only limited adjustments to the franchise.

In

the speech, he qualified his famous appeal to bring more electors
under the pale of the constitution by vowing not to, "recede from
the protest I have previously made against sudden, or violent, or
excessive, or intoxicating change."ll

Gladstone could thereby

merge progressive appeals on behalf of the working class with the
moderation of the whigs.
The death of Lord Palmerston and the declining influence of
Lord Russell were the first openings for Gladstone's emergence as
leader of the Liberal Party.

While the entire nation grieved the

loss of a statesman whose, "heart always beat for the honour of
England,,,12 Palmerston's death marked the end of a clearcut
course in domestic and foreign policy.

The direction of Britain's

foreign policy was unclear, but her diminished role and lack of
allies in European affairs were evident, with Russia hostile,
Prussia unfriendly, France estranged, and the united states angry.13
The passiveness and inactivity of British foreign policy since the
Crimean War and specifically in the wake of the Schleswig-Holstein
Crisis had left Britain only a secondary player with few options in
the new Bismarckian order.
The diplomatic baton was passed to Gladstone and Disraeli, two
leaders with uncertain capacity in the nuances of foreign pOlicy.
Each had his own distinct approach to foreign policy, but neither
could reverse the loss in terms of British influence.
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Gladstone

viewed politics as the arena in which to discover God's intentions
for the world, and foreign policy was the means of spreading God's
intentions throughout Europe and the globe. 14

His foreign policy

stressed the principle of collective, peaceful intervention, by way
of advice and recommendation. 15

But such intervention had to be

in accordance with the opinions of a nation's inhabitants. 16
Unfortunately, Gladstone's utterances were inapplicable to the new
rules governing diplomacy in Europe and Bismarck was convinced
that so long as the liberalism of 'Professor' Gladstone was dominant,
England's army would be weak and her diplomacy impotent. 17
On the other hand, Benjamin Disraeli's foreign policy commanded
respect from Bismarck.

In tune with the pursuit of national interest,

Disraeli saw a dynamic foreign policy as a means to personal power
and national glory.

Because they

mirrored his own approach,

Bismarck respected Disraeli's opportunism and his conservative strain.
Disraeli offered Britain a choice between "a comfortable England ....
meeting in due course an inevitable fate and a great country -- an
Imperial country .•.• a land of liberty, of prosperity, of power, and
of glory. illS

Again, however, domestic turmoil and limited

diplomatic options blunted the effect of Disraeli's eloquence.
That Gladstone and the statesmen of Britain failed to adjust
their foreign policy to an altered Europe indicates the degree of
Britain's isolation, their preoccupation with domestic events and
their miscalculation of the motives and capacity of Bismarck.

The

Liberal Party became the domain of reform, free trade, and limited
defense spending, but lost its claim to the foreign policy expertise
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it had had in Palmerston's years of glory.

The Prussian victory

over Austria in June of 1866 strengthened the foundations of the
Bismarckian order and further isolated Britain.
Gladstone's leadership of the Liberal Party was strengthened
by his numerous extra-parliamentary speeches, and his memorable
exchanges with Disraeli in the House of Commons.

Gladstone carried

the mantle of liberalism into the charged debates against the
conservative leader and the battles brought out the best in his
oratory and debating skills.

There is also little doubt that facing

his brilliant conservative opponent accelerated his evolution to
support for parliamentary reform and Irish Church disestablishment.
Gladstonian ideology had embraced reform since the late 1850s,
but only to the point of compromise.

He sponsored the limited

Russell Reform Bill of 1866, which sought only to delay a problem
that was ripe for social agitation.

Gladstone explained that he

supported reform because, "in freedom, in the free discharge of
political duties, there is an immense power both of discipline
and of education for the people.,,19
conservative in nature.

But the 1866 bill was

First, only limited suffrage extension

was granted so as not to undermine the mid-century order of state,
Party, and politics. 20

Secondly, Gladstone explained that

the measure was adopted because it left the working class in a
marked minority.21

Unfortunately, Russell and Gladstone had

miscalculated and the half-hearted bill garnered support from
neither side of the house.

Thirdly, because it

would be opposed

by those M.P.'s who would be dropped from the Commons if it included
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provisions for redistribution, the bill included only provisions
for franchise reform.

Gladstone explained that redistribution

would be addressed later, but was "a matter of only secondary
importance. 1122

Because of their aversion to redistribution,

this was music to the whig ears.

Ironically, it was the conservatives,

not the liberals, who would soon reopen the redistribution issue.
Gladstone had miscalculated.

General Grosvenor's amendment

on April 19 called for full disclosure of the Ministry's intentions
for the bill.

He charged that the Government had introduced the

bill, "like a thief in the night; it was masked; half its features
were disguised, and yet they were surprised that the House did not
fall in love with the object.,,23

Robert Lowe, who later served

in Gladstone's first Ministry, added that, "history may tell of
other acts as signally disastrous, but none more wanton, none more
disgraceful. ,,24

Even one of Gladstone's greatest speeches

reduced little of the opposition in the Commons.

He outlined the

Government's commitment to parliamentary reform: 25
You cannot fight against the future.
Time is on our
side. The great social forces which move onwards in
their might and majesty, and which the tumult of our
debates does not for a moment impede or disturb
those great social forces are against you; they are
marshalled on our side.
The Ministry could defeat the amendment by only five votes, an
obvious defeat, and the Russell Government resigned on June 19.
Its successor, the Derby Ministry, was immediately met by
two extra-parliamentary factors that combined to ripen the issue
of reform:

the financial crisis and the Reform League's Hyde Park

agitation in the summer of 1867. 26
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Gladstone feared that the

strife might worsen by involving forces that had not yet been
drawn into the heat of political controversy.

The minority status

of the Conservative Party combined with the prospect of working class
agitation to convince Disraeli that his party would benefit from a
major reform initiative.

He merely joined members on both sides of

the house who viewed it safe to concede working class enfranchisement
and dangerous to withhold it. 27

still, steadfast conservatives

were fearful and Lord Derby observed that, "we are making a great
experiment, and taking a leap in the dark. ,,28

By initiating·

the 1867 Reform Bill, Disraeli sacrificed his pledges to place and
his principles to power. 29
Gladstone stepped in to restructure the bill.

It was apparent

to him that Disraeli had intended to extend the franchise by one
part of his plan, while neutralizing its extension by the other. 3D
Disraeli's accent was on "fancy franchises", rating, dual votes,
and compound householders, all of which would only widen the
privileges of the upper classes. 31

Newfound pro-reform sentiment

arose from the "Tea Room Revolt" of April 5, 1867,32 giving
Gladstone more support to "make a good bill out of a bad bill.,,33
He condemned Disraeli's intentions by stirring up the Commons and the
press with his progressive appeals and he forced Disraeli to admit
that, "the government will never introduce household suffrage pure
and simple. 1I34

The summer's social strife had brought Gladstone

around to the view that if reform should come, it should be broad
and bold. 35

He had learned from his failure of 1866.

Gladstone succeeded in restructuring the Derby Ministry's
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major legislative initiative from the opposition front bench.
With the aid of the Hodgkinson Amendment on May 17 he forced
Disraeli to incorporate his eight progressive improvements into
the bill. 36

The bill's passage on July 15 strengthened the

whig-working class entente.

The whigs were loyal to Gladstone's

calculated success and continued to be leery of Disraeli, while
the working class owed its right to vote, its daily newspapers,
and the low prices of its daily food staples to the leader of the
Liberal Party.

Gladstone had brought both groups into his party.

Meanwhile, during the heat of the reform crisis in 1866,
tensions in Europe were growing.

Britain's miscalculation of

the Iron Chancellor further limited her foreign policy options
and doomed her to isolation.

Because his motives were seen as

inconsistent and unorthodox, Bismarck posed an enigmatic figure.
But British statesmen were not alone in failing to understand
"whether Herr von Bismarck thought more than he said, or said
more than he thought.,,37

Because he alone understood the new

European order, the Iron Chancellor was the only statesman in
Europe who could play the new game of diplomacy.
Austrian diplomacy was perhaps the easiest prey for
Bismarckian policy in Phase II, and the Iron Chancellor needed
none of the sophisticated tools for the Austrians which he required
against the French.

Bismarck first painted Austria into a diplomatic

corner through bluffs and then swiftly capitalized on her weakness
through force.

His diplomacy led to the victory over Austria which

demonstrated the capacity of Prussia's Minister, the strength of
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her army, and the worth of her armaments to an astonished continent. 38
Two events eased Bismarck's task.

First, he tested the

European powers at Gastein in August of 1865, by dictating one-sided
terms for the division of Schleswig and Holstein.

The relative

silence of European diplomacy to the terms fortified Prussian demands
and proved to Bismarck that "the statesman who fears has no chance
against the statesman who dares.,,39

Secondly, the Iron Chancellor

feigned acceptance of Napoleon's call for a conference on the German
Question in May of 1865, knowing that Austrian pride would reject
the offer and lead directly to conflict.

Again, Bismarck understood

that Austria's overconfidence would make her reject the opening
which might have saved her from disaster. 40
isolation, Britain could only watch.

Because of her

The Austrian rejection of the

conference removed the only diplomatic obstacle for Prussia, and
Bismarck sought only a cause for war.
To obtain just provocation, the Iron Chancellor relied on
his familiar combination of bluff and intimidation.

First, he

argued that Austria, who had already mobilized and suspended her
diplomatic ties to Prussia, was the aggressor by summoning the
Estates of Holstein without Prussian consent.

Sparked by Bismarck's

condemnation over the technicality, Austria declared war on June 18.
within weeks, the victory at Sadowa demonstrated the prominence of
Prussian iron, and Europe had seen no more crushing victory since
Waterloo. 41

Bismarck's defeat of Austria made Prussian hegemony

in Germany a virtual fait accompli by June of 1866.
The resounding force of the Pruss ian victory clouds both
39

Bismarck's diplomatic achievements and the failure of European
diplomacy.

The vacuum in European politics had allowed Bismarck

to threaten the status quo with provocative statements: 42
The great questions of the day will not be decided by
speeches and majority votes -- that was the great
mistake of 1848 and 1849 -- but through blood and iron.
He further boasted that Europe would soon have reason to know
"how superior our guns are to the Austrian artillery.,,43

By

combining duplicity with force, Bismarck secured his dominance of
Europe.
In Bismarck's scheme, France had to be isolated next to remove
the only remaining obstacle to Prussian policy.
France without an ally:

Three factors left

the Polish Question led to the collapse of

the Franco-Russian Entente, animosity continued in Anglo-French
relations, and Franco-Austrian tension grew over Italy.

Of these

factors, the key was the Anglo-French antagonism, which had developed
steadily since the French annexation of Nice and Savoy in 1859.
The enmity was expressed in the arms race 44 and in British
fears of Napoleon's expansionism, and led to a failure of their
foreign policies to cooperate even when objectives overlapped, as
in the Polish Question and the Schleswig-Holstein Crisis.

The Anglo-

French rift limited the foreign policy of both countries and played
into Bismarck's hands.
Three factors contributed to Bismarck's rise in Europe.

First,

as A.J.P. Taylor notes, by 1865, both Russia and Great Britain had
virtually eliminated themselves from the European balance. 45
The former had no interests in the west and clashed with Austria in
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the Near East.

Bismarck could thereby appeal to the Russian axiom:

"Better a strong Prussia than a strong Austria. 11 4 6

Britain's

preoccupation with domestic affairs and diplomatic isolation
weakened her statesmanship and her influence on the continent.
Secondly, Austria was plagued by ethnic centrifugal forces and
continued to lose influence within the German Confederation and
in Europe.

The chief interest of Austrian foreign policy was to

maintain its hold on Venetia and its role in Germany and the Near
East.

Finally, Italy was newly-unified and growing, and had set

its sights on Venetia to further its unification process.
Bismarck's manipulation of Napoleon allowed him to establish
a leading role in European affairs for Prussia.

He catered to

Napoleon's expansionism, exploited his overextension in Italy, and
capitalized on the growing Anglo-French antagonism.

In each of

these areas, few options were available for British statesmanship
to reduce the costs in terms of British isolation and the cementing
of the Bismarckian order in Europe.
Because he knew that Napoleon was susceptible to territorial
bribes, Bismarck could act on the Duke of Wellington's adage that,
"it is not possible to do anything great in the world without
France. 1147

Had Britain and France been less antagonistic,

Bismarck's offers of territory might have been less seductive to
the Emperor.

But in light of the cross-channel tensions, he could

continue his scheme.

First, Bismarck catered to Napoleon's

territorial aspirations in the Rhineland and Luxemburg.

Prussian

policy was couched in terms that would appeal to Napoleon, on the
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one hand holding out bait to French ambition; on the other, offering
a compliment to French pride.
to Napoleon:

Bismarck also made the tradeoff clear

France could compensate herself with annexations if

she gave Prussia a free hand in Germany.48

Napoleon knew that

his territorial extension depended upon cooperating with Prussia.
He pledged that the true interest of France was not to obtain an
increase of territory, but rather to help Germany in the most
favorable way for her interests and those of Europe. 49

By

delivering French neutrality in the Austro-Prussian conflict,
Napoleon played into Bismarck's hands.
The Luxemburg Crisis of the spring of 1867 seemed to realize
British fears of their southern rival.

But even the French threat

to Luxemburg's sovereignty could not bring British statesmen out
of their insular shell.

The absence of allies forced Lord Stanley,

the British Foreign Secretary, to pay only lip service to checking
French ambition in Luxemburg: 50
The guarantee now given is collective only. That is an
important distinction.
It means this, that in the
event of a violation of neutrality all the Powers who
have signed the treaty may be called upon for their
collective action. No one of these Powers is liable to
be called upon to act singly or separately. It is a
case, so to speak, of 'limited liability'. We are
bound by honour -- you cannot place a legal
construction upon it -- to see in concert with others
that these arrangements are maintained.
There is no indication that Gladstone or others in the Liberal
Party expressed any more concern than did the Derby Ministry over
Luxemburg.

There is perhaps no better reflection of the degree of

British detachment from the affairs of the European continent in
this period than the Luxemburg Question.
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Bismarck duped Napoleon into a pledge of neutrality in the
Austro-Prussian War without sacrificing a thing in return.

He

urged the French to assert themselves by annexing Luxemburg:
"commit yourselves.
fait accompli. 1I51

Present Europe and the King of Prussia with a
Then, without skipping a beat, he cited the

German responsibility to protect the small state and withdrew his
support for French annexation, offering instead a promise of
territory in the Near East.

His bluff had hurt French pride, and

Maustier complained in the autumn of 1867:
without salt, Luxembourg is the salt." 52

"You offer us spinach
with Napoleon bitter

and subject to Europe-wide condemnation, jealousy and suspicion
became the rule on the frontier of the Rhine. 53
The insurrection in Crete in the summer of 1866 was the next
piece in Bismarck's diplomatic puzzle.

until Crete, he had taken

the Near East for granted, but French support for the sanctity
of the Turkish Empire conflicted with both British and Russian
policy.

Thus, Bismarck could further estrange the French from the

courts of Europe.

The British were sympathetic to

the people of

Crete and Gladstone warned the Turks that mistreatment of them
would disgrace the Turks in the eyes of Europe. 54

The Czar

also supported the insurrection as a precedent for Pan-slavism in
the region.

British and Russian condemnation of French policy in

the Turkish Empire allowed Bismarck to close the door on French
diplomacy.
Bismarck's scheme was then furthered by annexing three German
states following the Austro-Prussian War.
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The swift Prussian victory

forced Napoleon to accept Bismarck's terms which incorporated the
4.5 million people of Hanover, Hesse and Frankfort, into the German
Confederation under Prussia, which removed another obstacle to German
unification.

Openly displaying his diplomatic isolation, Napoleon

had to concede these states to Prussia.
Bismarck had earlier turned to Italy to manipulate the Italians,
the French, and the Austrians.

The Iron Chancellor later reflected

on the importance of Italy to his scheme: "Si Italie n'existait pas,
il faudrait l'inventer.,,55

By dangling venetia as the spoils

of Italian cooperation in the Austro-Prussian War, Bismarck secured
the secret Prusso-Italian Treaty of April 8, 1866.

The promise of

venetia was enough to gain the Italian army against Austria, leaving
Austria facing a dreaded two-front war.
venetia was also a blind spot for French diplomacy.

Her

annexation was seen as another step towards crowning an Italian
nation, which Napoleon had long advocated as a counterweight to
Austrian strength in the region.

Bismarck knew the risks Napoleon

was prepared to take to obtain Venetia for Italy and encouraged his
overextension there.

French and Italian armies intent on Venetia

would thus surround Austrian forces.

Bismarck understood the motivation

of each power, and allowed Austria and France to promote the war which
led to the destruction of their traditional grandeur in Europe; and
for both Venetia was the deciding factor. 56

Bismarckian policy

feasted on French over-extension, Italian aspirations, and Austria's
vulnerabliity to a two-front war.
The Venetian Question was the lone opportunity in Phase II for
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British diplomacy to step in to avert the coming conflict.

After

Austria had rejected Napoleon's call for a Congress over the growing
Austro-Prussian tensions, she offered venetia to Italy in return
for Italian neutrality in Germany, and in order to avoid a twofront war.

strong, unambivalent British sponsorship of the offer,

ideally with French blessings, might have convinced the Italians to
accept.

without asking anything but a promise of Italian neutrality,

the Austrians would surrender the territory that would bring the
Italians into war.

But the Russell Ministry was preoccupied with

the issues of parliamentary reform and Fenian violence in Ireland
and played no role in the negotiations.
Domestically, Gladstone had built a foundation for the Liberal
Party.

His sponsorship of Irish Church disestablishment unified the

Liberal Party nationally and within the House of Commons.

until the

outbreak of Fenian violence, however, he saw the problems of church,
land and education in Ireland as related but out of all bearing on
the practical politics of the day.57

As his concept of religious

self-determination evolved by the late 1860s, he began to express
sympathy for the Irish plight.

He was committed to "wipe away the

stains which the civilized world has for ages seen,,58 in Britain's
Irish policy.

The Fenian violence helped ripen the Irish Church

issue.
The violence moved the Commons to suspend the writ of Habeas
Corpus by an overwhelming majority in February of 1866. 59

Despite

John stuart Mill's plea that the bill "was a cause for shame and
humiliation to the country,,,60 most in Britain shared Gladstone's
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view that the Fenians were "subversive to all that a civilized
community ought to cherish and maintain. ,,61

Many were sympathetic

to the causes of the uprising, but fearful of its violence.

The

attempted prison break at Clerkenwell Prison in London on December 11,
1867, injuring 120 civilians, pushed Gladstone to act for his party,
stating that for Ireland, "justice delayed is justice denied.,,62
Gladstone condemned the Anglican Church in Ireland, which
included only one-eighth of the Irish population in its ranks.
He saw Ireland as a disgrace and it was the Liberal Party's
responsibility to bring her, "into the condition of being a great
part of the glory of this Empire, instead of being, as hitherto, in
respects neither few or small, our danger and our reproach. 1I63
To Gladstone, the Irish Church had never demonstrated that it could
fulfill any of the objects for which a religious Establishment is
constituted. 64

After carrying a majority of sixty on his

resolution to disestablish on April 3, 1868, he was attacked by
Disraeli, who saw disestablishment as depriving Her Majesty's
subjects of their "precious privileges".65

Just before gaining

a majority of sixty-five for his resolution on April 30, Gladstone
replied that the Irish Church kept alive the principles of religious
inequality and religious ascendancy.66

Despite the bill's

rejection by the House of Lords on June 20, Gladstone's victory
secured the resignation of the Disraeli Ministry and passage for
the bill in the next session.

Gladstone had stolen the show for

his party.67
Gladstone's national popularity and the unity of the Liberal
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Party were peaking by the end of 1868.

He had won two major battles

against Disraeli from the opposition front bench by mobilizing his
support within the Liberal Party.

His major legislative successes,

the Irish Church Bill and the Reform Bill of 1867, could be added to
his national popularity in the canvassing for the November elections.
These victories and the relative stability within the Liberal Party
led to a majority of 112 in the 1868 elections and, accordingly,
Queen victoria's request for Gladstone to form his first ministry on
December 1 of that year.
Gladstone's rise to the leading role in British politics in
Phase II does not absolve him of some blame for the loss of British
influence in European affairs.

That he and his colleagues could not

adjust to a changing Europe is clear, but their failure to do so is
due to their few diplomatic options.
been painted into a corner.

British diplomacy had simply

By 1868 the new Bismarckian order

dictated that Britain could play no active role in Europe.
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PHASE III:

1869 to 1874

William Gladstone's first Ministry faced a variety of crises
in both the foreign and domestic spheres of policy.

Swept into

office at the outset of Phase III by the Liberal Party's overwhelming
victory in the 1868 Elections, the Prime Minister was armed with a
huge majority in the Commons, widespread popularity in the press
and his own arsenal of oratorical skills, parliamentary talents
and political stamina.

Although each crisis in European affairs

found the Ministry limited in diplomatic options, its foreign policy
fared well against the challenges of the new Bismarckian European
order.

Domestically, however, the Ministry's flawed legislative

programme and Gladstone's leadership problems loosened the hold
of liberalism on British politics by 1874.
Gladstone faced one of the most tumultous periods in British
politics in Phase III of this study in terms of party loyalty and
stability.

The Liberal Party's fragmented nature in this period

can be gauged in two ways.

In one measure of party loyalty, the

voting patterns of seventeen liberal M.P.'s, referred to as the
Adullamites, were analyzed in relation to Gladstone's votes for
the fifteen years of this study.1

Of the twenty-five key votes

studied, not one of the Adullamites matched Gladstone's positions
on each vote, and as much as thirty percent of the group's votes
strayed from his for the entire period. 2

The voting patterns

of the Adullamites show the limited loyalty that Gladstone could
summon within the Commons even on key issues.

A second measure

of party fragmentation is performance in the four parliamentary
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elections between 1859 and 1874.

In these fifteen years, only

thirty-one percent of British parliamentary seats were found to
be stable in terms of party loyalty.3

The high turnover of

parliamentary seats suggest domestic upheaval, party disorganization
and the absence of consensus on even key issues.
It was in this volatile political environment that Gladstone
accepted the Queen's request to form a government on December 11
1868 1 with a characteristic sense of duty.

His rise to the office

of Prime Minister capped his life-long application of justice l
peace l honour, duty, and piety to public service. 4

Much of

Britain shared his commitment to large-scale reform, with the
liberal landslide of 1868 providing not only a majority of 112,
but also a mandate for religious equality, educational opportunity,
and the release of public services from aristocratic control. 5
Fresh from the elections, and with a capable Cabinet intent on
reform measures, Gladstone could realize Lord Palmerston's

prophe~y

that, "whenever he gets my place we shall have strange doings. 1I6
Gladstone's foreign policy had remained a constant throughout
his public life.

His emphasis on morality in international relations

was a break from traditional British foreign policy.

But I because

his notion of an ecumenical council of civilised opinion appealed
neither to the whigs, who preferred the discreet bargains of the
closet, nor to the Radicals, who saw in it the sinister implications
of continental involvement, Gladstone lacked widespread support for
his foreign policy.

with Britain hopelessly mired in diplomatic

isolation by 1870, Clarendon could state that "Europe now cares no
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more about England than she does about Holland. 118
Several external events tested the Ministry.

Gladstone had

to respond to the challenges of the Papal Infallibility Doctrine,
the threat to Belgium and the Franco-Prussian War, all in 1870;
the terms of the Prussian victory; the renewed Russian challenge
in the Black Sea; and the Alabama Claims negotiations from 1870
to 1872.

In each, Gladstone secured British interests within the

context of his doctrine of international law, which can be seen
as follows: 9
The greatest triumph of our time, a triumph in a region
loftier than that of electricity and steam, will be the
enthronement of the idea of Public Right, as the
governing idea of European policy; as the common and
precious inheritance of all lands, but superior to the
passing opinion of any.
In the foreign policy of his first Ministry, Gladstone was willing
to use force on behalf of British interests when the need arose
and options were present.
Gladstone's first Ministry is clearly divided into two distinct
periods.

Between 1869 and 1870 the Ministry successfully passed

legislation like the Irish Church Bill of 1869 and the Irish Land
Bill and the Education Bill of 1870.

The Ministry's early popularity

is reflected in its competitive stance in the 1869 and 1870 byelections.

continuing its gains of the 1868 elections, the Liberal

Party netted three seats in the by-elections of 1869 and lost only
two seats in those of 1870. 10

Even Gladstone, never one to be

immodest, found his first year as Prime Minister to have passed with
"circumstances of favour far beyond what I had dared to anticipate. lIl1
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Between 1871 and 1874, however, legislative embarrassments
and intra-Cabinet quarrels overshadowed the previous triumphs of
the Ministry.

By March of 1873, Gladstone understood the depths

to which his party had fallen, stating that "there is now no cause.
No great public object on which the Liberal Party are agreed &
combined. ,,12

The falling popularity of the Liberal Party after

1870 is reflected in its disastrous performance in by-elections
between 1871 and 1874. 13

In these four years, the Conservative

Party averaged a net gain of five seats per year, including a peak
of eight seats in 1873. 14

The conservative resurgence and the

whig and Irish desertion of the Liberal Party led to the fall of
the Ministry.
Because Gladstone miscalculated the political impact of his
legislative agenda, his first Ministry fell from grace in five
short years.
Ministry.

Hence, we reach the paradox of Gladstone's first

On one hand, his legislation, avoiding the appearance

of social upheaval and violence, was conservative in tone and
alienated radicals and nonconformists by seeming half-hearted.
On the other hand, by undertaking difficult reform legislation
and failing to heed fears that he leaned towards the further
radical steps of English disestablishment, home-rule and secular
education, he alienated whig-liberals.

By attempting an ambitious

legislative agenda, Gladstone abandoned the formula he used in
Phase I and Phase II to create the whig-working class entente
for the Liberal Party:

vagueness and lack of party dogma.

The

precariousness of the Liberal coalition caught up with Gladstone.
Gladstone's first words upon his promotion to the office of
55

Prime Minister, that his "mission is to pacify Ireland,"15
provided the Ministry's focus for the next five years.
began his legislative assault on the Irish problem.

He then

Gladstone's

approaches to the Irish Upas Tree -- Church, Land, and Education
-- were novel, but his solutions were thoroughly conservative.
His object was to stabilize Ireland, not to restructure it for
the future. 16

For Gladstone, the Irish Question was one

problem to be solved for Britain to regain its leading role in
Europe. 17
The Prime Minister had personal reasons as well as political
considerations for advocating Irish Church Disestablishment in 1869.
Personally, he opposed concurrent endowment because demoninational
funding conflicted with his notion of religious self-determination.
His Irish Church Bill ended funding for the Church, but was by no
means an assault on Anglicanism, whose creeds, orders, and mission
would continue entirely unimpaired. 18

His political motivation

for Irish Church Disestablishment was its use as a unifying measure
for the Liberal Party.

He campaigned on the issue in the fall of

1868, and later boasted correctly that the elections had turned
mainly on the subject of the Irish Church. 19

with a mandate

for the bill bestowed by the 1868 elections, Gladstone could steer
the bill through the Commons free from disabling amendments.
While Gladstone sought only to punish harsh landlords, and
not to develop a new structure for tenant rights, whig-liberals
and many in Ireland opposed the principle of the Irish Land Bill.
The whigs saw the bill as a dangerous precedent for British landlord-
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tenant relations, while radicals felt that Gladstone's bill should
have gone farther.

The bill reverted to the conservative custom of

Ulster tenant right in granting compensation for disturbances and
ignored the issues of security of tenure and protection against raised
rent for tenants.

Gladstone outlined the objectives of the bill: 20

Every line of the measure has been studied with the keenest
desire that it shall import as little as possible of the
shock or violent alteration into any single arrangement
now existing between landlord and tenant in Ireland ....
Its operations, we believe, will be quiet and gradual.
Despite the bill's conservative nature, Gladstone failed to alleviate
whig fears that their livelihoods were under siege.
In a letter to his whig Foreign Secretary Clarendon, Gladstone
expressed his commitment to the land bill:

"to this all the early

part of the next Session is dedicated or doomed.,,21

The novelty

of the approach and the commitment of the Government created an
impression among whig-liberals that Gladstone rested the fate of
his Ministry on overhauling the social order.

That the bill passed

by the overwhelming majority of 442 to 11 is perhaps more due to
the party's popularity in 1870 than to widespread support for the
bill's provisions. 22
Meanwhile, the Liberal Party faced a growing Home Rule movement
in Ireland after the summer of 1870 which would mean disaster for
its legislation and its following there. 23

The staggering growth

of the Home Rule Party hurt the Liberal Party far more than the
Conservative Party.

For example, of the sixty-four Irish parliamentary

seats that began the 1869 session in Liberal Party hands, sixtyseven percent moved to the Home Rule Party in elections by 1874.
Conversely, only fifteen percent of Irish seats switched from the
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Conservative Party to the Home Rulers in the same period. 24
The growth of the Home Rule Party dealt a huge blow to the Liberal
Party's following in Ireland.
The Education Bill of 1870 further compromised the Ministry's
support within the Liberal Party.

The bill sought to offer adequate

elementary education throughout Britain, and Gladstone emphasized
that a school had been placed within the reach of every child. 25
Yet, because of Gladstone's personal commitment to denominationalism
and local funding, the bill became, in Forster's view, "the most
conservative proposal which might satisfy liberal opinion.,,26
Gladstone's version failed to provide the progressive solutions of
a country-wide school board, a national education system, and
compulsory attendance.
of his legislation.

Again, Gladstone miscalculated the impact

By injecting his religious fervor into the bill,

Gladstone compromised both whig and nonconformist support.

Both

groups were more advanced in their view of the role of religion in
education.

The whigs attacked with the Cowper-Temple Amendment,

which banned the use of formularies in public schools and radicals
were driven towards the alternative of secular education.
The first foreign challenge of the period came in the events
leading up to the Franco-Prussian War, which disrupted both the
Ministry's support and the peace of Europe.

Gladstone had little

respect for either side in the conflict, finding Napoleon and
Bismarck "nearly on a par,,,27 but he and his Cabinet saw France
as a "demon of ambition and aggression.,,28

His suspicions seemed

confirmed by Bismarck's publication of the 1867 Benedetti Treaty in
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the Times on July 25, 1870, which outlined Napoleon's eastward
designs. 29

Anglo-French enmity continued to playa key role in

Bismarck's diplomatic scheme.
Gladstone had few diplomatic options.

Alienated from France,

distrusting Bismarck, removed from the Pruss ian-minded Czar, and
with Austria again beset by inter-cultural conflict, he saw no
prospect for joint intervention.

At home, the consensus for

neutrality meant that the Prime Minister must maintain "intact
the character and fame of England while this unhappy war shall
continue. ,,30

Because of his antipathy to both sides and his

lack of diplomatic options, Gladstone made Britain's only role in
the conflict that of a spectator.
An opportunity for active British foreign policy to prevent
or at least delay the conflict presented itself early in the summer
of 1870.

Napoleon had been secretly negotiating with Austria and

Italy to form an alliance against Prussia.

In fact, Sir Spencer

Walpole maintains that if the battles of Wissembourg and Reichshofen
had been postponed for eight days, the alliance would have been
secured. 31

British support for the alliance might have lessened

anti-Prussian feeling in France and avoided war.

But, British

distrust of Napoleon, the uncertainty that Italy and Austria would
subject their armies to a war bearing no fruit for their interests,
the secrecy of the negotiations, and the rapid course of events doomed
the alliance and led to war.
The next external challenge to the Ministry came in 1870 not
from Prussia or France, but from the vatican.
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The Doctrine of

Papal Infallibility threatened the Government both at home and
abroad.

Domestically, it drew Gladstone's ire because it "cast

in doubt the civic allegiance of all Roman Catholic populations,"32
thereby severing a link that Gladstone had spent years building.
He also feared that the Papal decree would lead to an outbreak of
Fenian violence in Ireland. 33

Most importantly, the decree

conflicted with his religious outlook, which saw the political
influence of the Church as a threat to individual liberty.
Having always harbored resentment to the Pope's political rule
in Rome, Gladstone condemned the decree.

He observed that only

threats would be noted by a Pope whose "whole policy is based
on the rejection of reason.,,34

Because the carrot would no

longer work with the vatican, the Prime Minister hoped to use
Napoleon's forces as the stick.

with the Emperor overextended in

Italy, Gladstone had an opportunity to threaten Pius IX with
Italian invasion by urging the withdrawal of French troops from Rome.
To Gladstone, withdrawal of the troops was the only policy "which
the Pope & his myrmidons care about.,,35

But, the Anglo-French

antagonism limited Gladstone's options in responding to the Papal
Decree.
Although his diplomacy was respectable, Gladstone's policy
towards the Papacy alienated whigs both within and outside the
Cabinet.

His ministers, led by Clarendon, overruled Gladstone's

hopes of expressing Britain's strong opposition to the decree.
Then, Argyll and other whigs, in light of the threat posed by
the Paris Commune, sought coercive legislation to put down the Fenian
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violence and challenged Gladstone's release of the remaining Fenian
prisoners.

Gladstone's response to the Papal decree failed both

at home and abroad. 36
The threat to Belgian sovereignty was the next external threat
to the Ministry.

Gladstone held to the terms of the Treaty of 1839,

stating that a French or German threat to Belgian neutrality would
bring Britain to the "very edge of war. ,,37

In one of his greatest

foreign policy initiatives, Gladstone concluded a treaty guaranteeing
Belgian safety.

The treaty stipulated that if one side violated

Belgian neutrality, then Britain would join the other for her defense,
but without entering the large-scale conflict. 38
Gladstone's swift and resolute action on behalf of Belgium was
popular in Britain.

He had authored a major treaty while risking

little chance of engaging Britain in armed conflict.

If the treaty

failed to guarantee Belgian neutrality, Gladstone showed signs of
his willingness to intervene militarily.

On July 16, 1870, he

asked Cardwell to submit a report on the possibility of sending
20,000 men to Antwerp to further protect Belgium. 39

Gladstone

thereby proved his willingness to involve his country in continental
affairs when the sanctity of a treaty was compromised or a fundamental
British interest was at stake.
The outbreak of the Franco-Prussian War posed the greatest
threat to the Ministry's foreign policy.

But Gladstone and the

Cabinet acted in a restrained manner due to British diplomatic
isolation and the demands of an ambitious legislative agenda.

That

the Gladstone Ministry managed to protect Britain's interests and
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avoid entangling her in the conflict is a testament to its sound
diplomacy.

Bismarck's foreign policy was never better than in the

days leading up to the Franco-Prussian War.

In just a few weeks,

the Iron Chancellor reduced France from the first place among
European nations to fifth or even sixth place. 40

By manipulating

French fears one moment and French pride the next, Bismarck forced
the ill-prepared Napoleon into the tragic undertaking.

It was a

conflict that even Marshall Niel, the French Minister of War, claimed
no part in, declaring that he would rather be cut in pieces than
advise the Emperor to enter a European war without allies. 41
Napoleon's mishandling of the spanish Throne Crisis in the
spring of 1870 allowed Bismarck to set his trap.

The fatal mistake

on the French part was the Duc de Gramont's ex post facto demand for
a Prussian guarantee that no Hohenzollern would ever sit on the
Spanish Throne.

The mistake altered European opinion, which until

then had rested with France, but, as a result of the unnecessary
demand, was transferred to Prussia. 42

The Spanish Question

gave Bismarck the edge he needed against the French.
Preoccupied with the Irish Land and Education Bills, the
Ministry failed to note the sharpened Franco-Prussian tensions.
Gladstone outlined the Government's insulation from the crisis: 43
.... the Government have exercised, and will exercise,
all the legitimate and friendly influence they may be
supposed to possess ..•. for the purpose of preventing an
event so calamitous and so deplorable as that a great
European conflagration and bloodshed should arise.
Had his Cabinet been less strained domestically, Gladstone might
have made a stronger offer to use the British good offices to

62

mediate.

But, because of the rapid course of events and the deep-

seated hostility on both sides, there is no indication that such
an overture would have been accepted in either Berlin or Paris.
Bismarck struck while French forces were unprepared.

His

alteration of the Ems Telegram moved the overconfident Napoleon
to declare war.

The French, disorganized militarily, were soon

awestruck by the Prussian war machine, which had longed for a
chance to measure itself against France. 44

Once mobilized,

the strength of the Prussian military forces overmatched the French.
Gladstone conveyed his miscalculation of the consequences of German
unification, when he stated that it was "not a matter on which
other countries are entitled to take any hostile cognisance.,,45
His diplomacy was hamstrung by his limited options, but it risked
no British interests or British forces on his uncertain understanding
of the new Bismarckian order.
While a consensus existed in Britain regarding neutrality in
the Franco-Prussian War, the debate over the British role in the
postwar negotiations was more divisive.

The peace talks represent

the crowning of Bismarck's Europe and the final defeat of Gladstone's
notion of international cooperation.

By the autumn of 1870, force

had replaced negotiation in European diplomacy and all of Europe
breathed a harsher air. 46

At home, disagreement within the

Cabinet over Britain's role in the peace talks limited Gladstone
to only watch as Germany dictated severe peace terms.
Because he knew that they would have wide implications for
Europe, Gladstone hoped for Britain to play an active role in the
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talks.

He was unopposed to flexibility of boundaries, but required

legitimation of their change. 47
Prussia's demands.

He had three concerns about

First, he argued that because the legitimate

defense of Germany did not necessitate its domination of AlsaceLorraine, the region should be neutralized.

Secondly, in a letter

to John Bright he condemned the German argument that victory entitled
her to territory:48
My opinion certainly is that the transfer of territory
and inhabitants by mere force calls for the reprobation
of Europe, & that Europe is entitled to utter it, & can
utter it with good effect.
Finally, Gladstone objected to German designs on Alsace-Lorraine
without considering the rights of its people.

He held that the

inhabitants of the region should not be handed over to Germany
against their will. 49
Two factors limited Gladstone's policy.

First, although it

agreed with the general terms of Gladstone's argument, the Cabinet
was hesitant to involve Britain in the negotiations.

A more

confident Prime Minister might have brought the Cabinet to his side,
but Gladstone was preoccupied with domestic affairs, understood the
limited diplomatic options available, was never an expert on foreign
matters, and was a shaky leader of his Ministry.

He therefore failed

to win his Cabinet's favor for an activist policy.

Led by the whigs

Granville and Hatherley, the Cabinet took the view that it would
intervene only if British interests were at stake.

Granville wrote

of his battle with Gladstone over the peace talks: 50
Quite exhausted .... after the longest fight I ever had
against Gladstone. The losses were great; the killed
and wounded innumerable; but I remained in possession
of the field and the Cabinet. He wanted to declare our
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views on the conditions of peace; I was against doing
so.
Gladstone experienced the greatest foreign policy defeat of his
first Ministry at the hands of his own Cabinet.

Secondly, British

condemnation of the peace terms was muzzled by her isolation from
European affairs.

Gladstone's high-principled assault was ignored

in Berlin without the combined force of the European powers.

His

words had no power to moderate the policy of blood and iron. 51
During the heat of the Alsace-Lorraine Question, another
challenge to European peace and British diplomacy appeared in the
form of the Gortchakoff Circular.

Gladstone's support for a

conference to settle the dispute over the Russian renouncement of
the 1856 Treaty of Paris was unpopular domestically and highlighted
Britain's diplomatic isolation.

At home, the Ministry had to weather

Disraeli's attacks on the risks of the London Conference.

Disraeli

assailed the Ministry's support for the London Conference as
contradictory and inconsistent. 52
In diplomatic terms, however, the Cabinet's policy toward the
Russian Black Sea demands of 1870 should be applauded on three levels.
First, Granville's treaty revision in 1870 endangered no British
interests because the agreement afforded Turkey as much leeway as
it did Russia. 53

Secondly, because of the relative disinterest

among the other powers of Europe for the Russian action, the Ministry
had little chance of maintaining the Treaty of Paris as it stood. 54
For example, the French sent a representative only for the official
signing of the new treaty.

Finally, and most importantly, Gladstone

turned the tables on the initial Russian challenge by bringing the
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dispute under the collective consideration of the European powers,55
thereby setting a precedent for the future.

The precedent was in

Granville's conclusion that an essential principle of the law of
nations was "that no power can liberate itself from the engagements
of a treaty.,,56
By 1871, the Gladstone Ministry had lost the support of the
whigs.

The Irish Land and Education Bills of 1870, the growth of

Fenian violence, the Russian Black Sea challenge, and intra-Cabinet
tensions over the Papal decree and the fate of Alsace-Lorraine
combined to weaken the Ministry.

Whigs from both within and

outside the Cabinet deserted Gladstone over these issues.

The whig

George Grey challenged the Prime Minister to make a firm stand against
the extreme sections of the party or "some of our institutions will
be in great danger. 1I57

Another whig, Earl Fortescue, reacted

against the pull of nonconformity and the creation of the Home-Rule
Association in Ireland in the spring of 1870 by vowing that
"constitutional whigs are not going to be dragged into the abyss
of wild democracy merely to keep out the Tories." 58

By the time

of Disraeli's Crystal Palace Speech in June of 1872, which sought
to win disaffected whigs to the conservative side, it was clear that
Britain was experiencing a conservative resurgence.

The conservative

backlash was accelerated by the Ministry's further legislation,
its financial bumbling, the Alabama negotiations and the failure
of the Irish University Bill in 1873.

The Army Regulations Bill of 1871 and the Civil Service Act
of 1870 reflect the reasons for the fall of Gladstone's first
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Ministry.

The Prime Minister hoped to replace the corruption of

Army promotion purchases and civil Service patronage with meritbased systems.

But both bills were taken by the Court and the

landed classes as an assault on their way of life and helped to
accelerate their steady drift away from the Liberal Party.
Gladstone saw his attackers as representing the failure of the
landed class to justify its existence in the modern world. 59
The bills drove the whig Knatchbull-Hugessen to express his growing
distrust of Gladstone's "leaning to the extreme party.,,60
The issues of local taxation and the role of trade unions
further estranged both the whigs and the radicals from the Liberal
Party.

The debate over local taxation was in full swing during

the 1872 session,61 with the Lopes measure defeating the
Ministry by a hundred votes. 62

The Trade Union and Criminal

Law Amendment Acts of 1871 caused further alarm among whigs because
they seemed to lead to domestic upheaval.

In practice, however,

radicals were put off by the conservative interpretations of the
laws, which led to violence and condemnation of the Government.
Gladstone was largely unsympathetic to the union causes, but saw
the political gains in granting moderate concessions.
Gladstone's policy angered all and pleased none.

Again,

To whigs and

industrialists, the Ministry appeared to be taking the side of
strikes and social disturbance, while, to the radicals, it appeared
to be sanctioning repression.
The Alabama Claims Question occupied three years and severely
tested the Prime Minister's energy and political tact.
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Gladstone's

patience resulted in perhaps his greatest foreign policy achievement:
establishing the use of arbitration as a means of settling
international disputes.

At home, however, the length of the

negotiations and costs of the settlement created the impression that
the Ministry was weak.
Gladstone publicly denounced American intentions in the Alabama
dispute.

He maintained the position from the outset that he would

make no admission "that reparation is due from us to America in the
matter of the Alabama.,,63

He made light of the American claims,

arguing that Britain could make similar remonstrances against the
united states for its role in causing the Lancashire Famine 64
and in North American Fenianism. 65

He would under no circumstances

allow the Cabinet to stray from its, "sacred and paramount duty,,66
to its country in the negotiations.

He would not budge from his

view that the matter should go before arbitration and that American
indirect claims should be dropped.

His patience allowed both to be

achieved in the final settlement in June of 1872.
The significance of the Alabama Question lies in Gladstone's
commitment to arbitration as an effective tribunal for international
disputes.

The Prime Minister saw the impact of the Alabama Question

in the scope of its bearing on the subject of arbitration and "upon
the future interests of the world. ,,67

He risked British prestige

on an experiment in the application of justice and morality to
international disputes and emerged with a victory for his diplomacy.
Domestically, Disraeli's harsh attacks marred Gladstone's
victory.

Following the arbitrator's decision that Britain owed
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$15.5 million to the united states,68 the conservative leader could
emphasize the Government's feebleness in the negotiations: 69
It does appear to me that if we get into a Serbonian
bog of diplomacy upon this matter the consequences may
be enormous and fatal.
It is one of those questions
which ought not be allowed to drag its own slow length
along.
The time eaten by the negotiations and the cost of the settlement
blemished the diplomatic precedent set by Gladstone's policy.
A great leader possesses the political agility to adjust
both his agenda and personal approach to the political exigencies
of the day.

Because Gladstone would not adjust his legislative

agenda, he lost the support of the whigs on one hand by appearing
to drift towards the radical sector, and the radicals on the other
by offering seemingly half-hearted solutions to societal problems.
Instead of anticipating a conservative resurgence by 1870 as a
reaction to the reforms of 1867, Gladstone clung to his agenda and
never publicly emphasized the concessions that his legislative
offered each group in the Liberal Party.
Gladstone's shaky leadership of the Ministry also contributed
to divisions within the party and accelerated the fall of the
Government.

His overbearing and moralizing manner was more suited

to a cabinet position than for the office of Prime Minister. 70
He lacked interest in gossip and in the small change of politics
and "intimidated colleagues and subordinates from keeping him in
touch with those small details which signal danger to the acute
political eye.,,71

Gladstone was an enigmatic figure to his

Cabinet and was an inconsistent and under-confident leader.
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His uncertain leadership in the questions of the budgets and
the Estimates crippled the Ministry.

First, finding Lowe at the

Exchequer an ineffective ally against the spending departments,
he lost his party's monopoly on the issue of government thrift.72
Lowe's 1871 Budget had to be withdrawn by Gladstone and became a
major embarrassment to the Ministry.

Similarly, the Cabinet lost

popularity by battling over the Estimates.

The French loss to

Prussia in 1870 removed the only threat to British coastal defenses
and, to Gladstone, all legitimate demands for increased defense
spending.

Nonetheless, projections for the Army Estimates rose by

over eighteen percent between the budgets of 1870-71 and 1872-73. 73
That Gladstone could not maintain his trademark "retrenchment" is
a testament to his weak leadership of the Cabinet.
Facing a conservative resurgence and with a divisive legislative
agenda, the defeat of the Irish University Bill in 1873 sealed the
fate of the Government.

Although solving the University Question

in Ireland was a progressive aim, the bill drafted by Gladstone and
Thring, the legislative counsel, was conservative.

From the start,

Gladstone had private reservations about the bill because of the
fragmentation of the Liberal Party.

He saw "no more doubtful point

in the composition & tendencies of the Liberal Party than its
disposition to extremes in the matter of unsectarianism.,,74
Nonetheless, Gladstone saw the issue as a unifier for his party and
announced that the bill was vital to the existence of the Government. 75
The provisions of the University Bill were "characteristically
neat and Burkean",76 but still failed to gain support within the
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Liberal Party.

It was defeated for three reasons:

the desertion

of Irish M.P.'s, largely due to the rise of the Home Rule Party,
the conservative resurgence -- Glyn (Chief Whip) had reported on
July 6, 1872, that the Liberal majority had dwindled from 112 to 86
77 and the whig assumption that the bill set a dangerous precedent
for British higher education.
The whigs fled from the University Bill for two reasons.
First, the Gladstone Ministry seemed to be threatening a fundamental
axiom of British society:
of England.

the bond between education and the Church

Secondly, with the Government obviously in peril due

to its diminishing majority, the conservative resurgence was
apparent to the whigs.

The handwriting was on the wall following

the Ministry's defeat on the Irish University Bill in the spring of
1873.

Disraeli understood the depths to which the Liberal Party

had fallen and brilliantly rejected office so that it could expose
its own vulnerabilities.

By the autumn of 1873, Gladstone had

little hope for his party and found himself the leader of a
demoralized government with little hope of remaining in power.
Gladstone's first Ministry poses several paradoxes.

While

Phase III of this period marks the beginning of a new era of
domestic reform, it also saw the precariousness of the Liberal
Party and the growth of pluralism defeat a capable and reformminded Ministry.

Stronger and more flexible leadership and a less

rigid legislative agenda from a Prime Minister already enjoying
tremendous popularity, an overwhelming majority in the Commons, and
an electoral mandate for reform might have secured the hold of
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liberalism on Great Britain.

Yet, while Gladstone and his Ministry

failed the test of the 1874 Elections, the reforms of his first
Ministry and the benefits of the liberal experiment have passed the
test of time.
Similarly, although Gladstone was preoccupied with domestic
struggles and, because of Britain's isolation, had few options in
the international arena, the foreign policy record of his first
Ministry is respectable.

Gladstone's foreign policy in Phase III

regained little of Britain's past glory and position in Europe,
but it sacrificed nothing in the face of new external challenges.
The legacy of Gladstone's foreign policy is his reliance on justice,
treaty obligations and international cooperation as the guiding
principles in diplomacy.

Indeed, Gladstone's solutions to the Black

Sea Question and the Alabama dispute set precedents for future
interaction between nations, just as the Prime Minister's principles
and commitment to his beloved nation set precedents for future
statesmen.
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CONCLUSION
This study has sought to determine whether Gladstone's
statesmanship is to blame for Britain's loss of influence in
European affairs.

The interpretation suggested here through the

discussion of the events between 1859 and 1874, is that Britain
was already diplomatically isolated by the end of Phase I and
had few diplomatic options in Phase II and Phase III.

Thus, with

his hands tied diplomatically by the new Bismarckian order, Gladstone
had no chance of regaining Britain's lost influence when he assumed
the office of Prime Minister from 1869 to 1874.
In Phase I, 1859 to 1874, Gladstone's financial policy met the
challenges of pluralism and unified the Liberal Party under his
leadership.

But, the tone was set for Britain's isolation from

the continent for the next fifteen years.

Bismarck's new European

order was assured by the sharpening of the Anglo-French tensions
after Napoleon's annexation of Nice and Savoy in 1860.

The Polish

Question of 1862 was proof of the cross-channel enmity, allowing
Bismarck's aggression in Schleswig-Holstein in 1864 to doom Britain's
foreign policy to a secondary role in European affairs.
In Phase II, 1865 to 1868, Britain was severely tested by
the movement for parliamentary reform.

Again, Gladstone showed

that his domestic policy was up to the challenge by authoring the
1867 Reform Bill which unified the Liberal Party.

The preoccupations

of reform gave both the Russell and Derby Ministries no time for
diplomatic challenges that mattered little to the European order
because events had already painted Britain into a diplomatic corner
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by Palmerston's death in 1865.

Because of Britain's isolation, her

statesmen had little room to maneuver and few diplomatic options.
Gladstone and his colleagues could only watch as Bismarck further
consolidated his rule of Europe by trouncing Austria in the summer
of 1866.

By the 1868 Elections, which bestowed a tremendous majority

of 112 on the Liberal Party, Britain was without diplomatic options.
Phase III, 1869 to 1874, provided Gladstone and liberalism
with their first test at the helm of British policy.

Gladstone

and his first Ministry overlooked the precarious coalition that
was the British Liberal Party and attempted a divisive legislative
agenda.

By antagonizing each segment of the liberal coalition

by a part of the agenda, and thereby dividing the whig-working class
entente, Gladstone allowed domestic embarrassments to overshadow
his relatively successful foreign policy.

In so doing, he lost

widespread support for his party despite his diplomatic prowess in
protecting Belgian sovereignty, organizing the Black Sea Conference,
and establishing the precedent for arbitration in the Alabama Claims
Question.

Although his domestic policy faltered during his first

Ministry, his diplomacy was respectable in light of his options.
Gladston~S

legacy for this period is his patronage of the

liberal movement in Britain and his infusion of morality into the
art of politics.

For the benefit of the Liberal Party, Gladstone

merged his Burkean liberalism with the movement and transformed
British domestic policy from the disinterest of Palmerston's era
to his reform-minded legislation that was ahead of its time.

His

legislative achievements are numerous, including the 1860 Budget,
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the Cobden Treaty, the Paper Duties Repeal, the 1867 Reform Bill,
the Irish Church Bill, the Irish Land Bill, the Education Bill,
and the Army Reform Bill.

Up to 1870, his legislative record was

outstanding and his efforts unified the Liberal Party by offering
something to each component group in the coalition.

without Gladstone's

patronage, the liberal movement in Britain would have faltered.
No British statesman, before or since, had such high standards
for himself or his nation.

Gladstone's eclectic religious outlook

and uncompromising moral principles were injected into his foreign
policy and his legislation.

But, his ethical approach to foreign

policy was reduced by the new Bismarckian order which, by isolating
Britain, gave her few options in responding to continental events.
Gladstone's leadership was far from perfect, but one cannot
point to his statesmanship as the cause of the loss of British
influence in continental affairs in the new Bismarckian order.

He

inherited a Britain beset by two confounding problems and could
solve only the most important challenge, the domestic.

On one hand,

the rise of liberalism threatened to overturn domestic order and
confronted his moderate ideology.

He responded by adjusting his

ideology and hedging his progressive evolution to sponsor the
Liberal Party through financial policy and legislative initiatives
while avoiding domestic upheaval.

On the other hand, the Bismarckian

order established by the Schleswig-Holstein Crisis of 1864 left
Britain without an ally and without a role in Europe.
By the time Gladstone assumed the responsibility of foreign
policy in 1869, British options were further reduced and Bismarck
79

was well on his way to European hegemony.

In light of British

diplomatic options, the foreign policy of Gladstone's first Ministry
was respectable and did not further isolate Britain.

The damage to

British influence had been done under Palmerston, and Gladstone
simply could not make up the difference.

As a result, in the age

of nationalism, Britain would maintain its isolation for the next
fifteen years at the hands of the Iron Chancellor and the Liberal
Party was demoted to minority status.
Between 1859 and 1874, Gladstone faced one of the most tumultous
periods in British History.

Despite unprecedented challenges in

both foreign and domestic affairs, Gladstone's statesmanship set
a new level of achievement for British leaders and established
liberalism as a force in European affairs.

His statesmanship in

this period proves that morality can be successfully pursued in the
art of politics.
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